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Regional development aid: challenging the Commission to protect 
the environment
by Brian Jack
Much has been written about the role 
of the European Commission, for 
example under art. 169 of the EC Treaty, 
as the Community policeman working to 
protect the environment. Less 
consideration, however, has been given to 
the fact that, within the Community legal 
system, the Commission is also called 
upon to make administrative decisions 
which may have environmental 
consequences. This authority has been 
conferred upon the Commission by the 
EC Treaty itself (for example art. 93 
concerning state aid) and by secondary 
legislation. Through such secondary 
legislation, the Commission has been 
authorised to make decisions relating to 
the allocation and supervision of regional 
development aid. The purpose of this 
article is to consider whether any course 
of action exists where such decisions 
prove to have an adverse environmental 
effect.
REGIONAL AID
Currently regional development aid 
accounts for approximately one third of 
all Community expenditure (Eurostat 
Yearbook 1997, at p. 423). This aid is 
available to member states through a 
number of funds, principally the 
guidance section of the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund ('EAGGF), the European Regional 
Development Fund ('ERDF') and the 
European Social Fund ('ESF'). The 
operation of these funds is currently
governed by Regulations 2052/88, OJ 
1988 LI85/9 (as amended by Regulation 
2081/93, OJ 1993 L193/5) and 
4253/88, OJ 1988 L374/1 (as amended 
by Regulation 2082/93, OJ 1993 
L193/20). Regulation 24253/88, art.l 
sets the following objectives for the co- 
ordinated operation of these funds:
(1) promoting the development and 
structural adjustment of regions 
whose development is lagging 
behind;
(2) converting regions ... seriously 
affected by industrial decline;
(3) combating long-term unemployment 
and facilitating the integration into 
working life of young people and 
persons exposed to exclusion from 
the labour market;
(4) facilitating the adaptation of workers 
of either sex to industrial changeso
and to changes in production 
systems;
(5) promoting rural development by:
(a) speeding up the adjustment of 
agricultural structures in the 
framework of the reform of the 
common agricultural policy; and
(b) facilitating the development and 
structural adjustment of rural 
areas.
However, Regulation 2052/88, art. 7 
specifically requires all measures financed 
by regional aid to conform with the 
Community treaties and with 
Community policies such as 
environmental protection. In this regard, 
art. 130(R)(2) of the EC Treaty provides 
that environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of other 
Community' policies. Whilst the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
declared environmental protection to be 
one of the Community's essential 
objectives (Procureur de la Republique v 
Association de Defense des Bruleurs d'Huiles
Usagees ('Waste Oils') (Case 240/83) 
[1985] ECR 531, at p. 548). 
Additionally, Regulation 4253/88, art. 24 
authorises the Commission to withhold 
or recover payments where an 
investigation reveals evidence of a failure 
by member states to honour such 
commitments.
CHALLENGING REGIONAL 
AID PAYMENTS
Both the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
and the ECJ have now considered two 
cases in which individuals and 
environmental associations sought to 
challenge Commission decisions on 
regional aid, which they believed had 
taken insufficient account of Community 
environmental law. These were the cases:
  An Taisce   The National Trust jbr Ireland 
and World Wide Fund for Nature UK 
(WWF(UK)) v EC Commission (Case 
C-325/94P) order, [1996] ECR 
1-3727 (before the CFI: Case 
T-461/93; [1994] ECR 11-733); and
  Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace 
International) $_ Ors v EC Commission 
(before the CFI: Case T- 5 8 5/9 3) 
[1995] ECR 11-2205); before the ECJ: 
Case C-321/95P [1998] 3 CMLR 1).
In both cases the applicants sought to 
mount their challenge through art. 173 
of the EC Treaty.
Article 173 provides the ECJ with the 
power to review acts of Community 
institutions which have legal effect. 
Under art. 173(2), member states, the 
Council of Ministers and the 
Commission have unlimited standing to 
challenge such acts, whilst the European 
Parliament and the European Central 
Bank may do so in order to protect their 
prerogative powers. However, under art. 
173(4) natural or legal persons only 
enjoy limited standing. Such persons may 
only challenge a decision which is 
addressed to them   either a regulation 
which is in the form of a decision or a 
decision which is addressed to someone 
else but is of direct and individual
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concern to the applicant. The An Taisce 
and Greenpeace cases have revealed two 
principal problems in the application of 
this provision. These relate to whether a 
decision actually exists which is capable 
of review and also whether such a 
decision is of direct and individual 
concern to the applicant.
EXISTENCE OF A 
REVIEWABLE DECISION
In many cases, rather than seeking 
regional aid for specific projects, member 
states seek to put into place multi-annual 
programmes. This approach is authorised 
by Regulation 2052/88, art. 5. Such 
programmes may set out the strategy 
which the member state will follow and 
that member state's objectives over 
future years. However, they are not 
required to give details of the individual 
projects which the member state may 
intend to undertake within that period. 
This creates the problem that a member 
state may subsequently announce an 
intention to conduct a specific project 
which in some way violates Community 
environmental law.
This is essentially what occurred in the 
An Taisce case. In this case the Irish 
government submitted regionalo o
development plans to the Commission in 
March and May 1989. These plans 
included a multi-annual operational 
programme for tourism, which was 
approved by the Commission in 
December 1989. The programme, 
however, did not outline the specific 
projects which were to be conducted. 
Subsequently, on 22 April 1991, the Irish 
government announced a plan to 
construct an interpretative centre for 
visitors, at Mullaghmore, County Clare. 
This was within an area known as the 
Burren, whose limestone grasslands and 
pavements are an important wildlife 
habitat. WWF(UK) lodged a complaint, 
with the Commission, against the 
project. An Taisce subsequently joined in 
this complaint. The Commission initially 
wrote to the Irish Permanent 
Representative in Brussels, informing 
him that the Commission intended to 
institute proceedings against the 
Republic of Ireland, under art. 169 of the 
EC Treaty. Subsequently, in October 
1992, they issued a press release 
reversing that decision. In the press 
release, the Commission indicated its 
conclusion that the proposed work
complied with Community environmental 
law.
The ECJ has confirmed that it is 
generally not possible to use art. 173 to 
review a Commission decision not to 
commence art. 169 proceedings (see, e.g. 
Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter eV v EC 
Commission (Case C-107/95P) [1997] 
ECR 1-947). Additionally, there is likely 
to be little point in seeking to utilise art. 
173 to challenge the Commission's 
decision authorising the initial 
operational programme. For example, in 
the An Taisce case, the Commission 
decision in December 1991 approving 
the Irish government's operational 
programme for tourism was fully in 
accordance with Community law. 
Regulation 2052/88 authorised the 
Commission to approve such multi- 
annual programmes. Secondly art. 173 
requires that proceedings should be 
initiated within two months of the 
publication of the contested act. Often, 
that period will have expired before 
member states announce details of the 
projects through which they intend to 
implement their operational 
programmes. For example, in the An 
Taisce case, a period of fifteen months 
spanned the Commission decision and 
the announcement of the contested 
project by the Irish government.
In the An Taisce case, the applicants 
WWF(UK) and An Taisce adopted a 
different approach. They alleged that the 
fact that the Commission had taken a 
decision not to institute art. 169 
proceedings implied that the 
Commission had also taken a decision 
not to suspend or recover payments to 
the Irish government, as they would have 
been entitled to have done under 
Regulation 4253/88, art. 24. They then 
sought to challenge this alleged decision. 
Both the CFI and the ECJ rejected the 
applicant's contention. Both courts 
found that the adoption of a decision 
under art. 169 was distinct from the 
adoption of a decision under the 
regulation. The mere fact that the 
Commission had decided not to institute 
art. 169 proceedings did not imply that a 
separate decision had been taken under 
the regulation. Therefore both courts 
rejected the application.
Also in the An Taisce case, the 
Commission argued that once the 
Commission had approved a general 
operational programme, the member
states had competence to build projects 
of their choice. They therefore argued 
that only decisions of the member states 
should then be of concern, not those of 
the Commission. However, this appears 
to overlook the fact that the 
implementation of programmes assisted 
by regional aid is subject to a monitoring 
system. Regulation 4253/88, art. 25 
provides for this system to operate 
through the creation of monitoring 
committees. Whilst the Commission is 
entitled to delegate representatives, the 
precise composition of each committee is 
a matter of agreement between the 
individual member state and the 
Commission. However, one 
commentator notes that, in practice, the 
Commission:
'asserts ... "a non negotiable right of 
veto", with a view of ensuring, inter alia, the 
conformity of operations jinanced by [the EC] 
with Community environmental law and 
policy.' (J Scott, EC Environmental Law 
(1998), Longman (London), at p. 137)
This shows continued Commission 
involvement in the application of 
Community structural funds. However, it 
is unclear whether the operation of these 
monitoring committees would be open 
to review. As Scott points out, it cannot 
be assumed that a positive decision by a 
monitoring committee, inferring that theo ' o
Commission representative did not 
exercise the veto, will be interpreted as 
evidence of a Commission decision to 
approve the project.
'DIRECT AND INDIVIDUAL 
CONCERN'
Even where there is proven to be a 
reviewable Commission decision, 
applicants must additionally show that 
that decision is of direct and individual 
concern to them. This was an issue 
considered by both the CFI and ECJ in 
the Greenpeace case. In that case, 
Greenpeace International, two Canary 
Island based environmental associations 
(Tagoror Ecologista Alternative and 
Comision Canaria contra la 
Contaminacion) and sixteen Canary 
Islands' residents sought to challenge ano o
alleged Commission decision addressed 
to Spain. This alleged decision concerned 
continued funding under the ERDF for 
the construction ot two power stations. 
The applicants alleged that the 
Commission had taken a decision to 
continue this project even though it had 
received a number of complaints from 
local residents. These complaints alleged 
that Spain had commenced construction 
of the power stations without conducting 
a full assessment of their environmental 
impact, as required by Directive 85/337 
on the assessment the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the 
environment (OJ f985 LI75/40). This 
directive also gave individuals the right too o
participate in the assessment.
In previous litigation concerning art. 
173, the ECJ has found decisions to be of 
direct concern to applicants where they 
confer no discretion upon the person to 
whom they are addressed. If that 
addressee has a discretion as to whether 
to implement the decision, then 
applicants affected by that decision will 
not be held to be directly concerned (SA 
Alcan Aluminium Raeren v EC Commission 
(Case 69/69) [1970J ECR 385). 
Alternatively, a decision which does 
confer such a discretion upon the 
addressee may also be found to be of 
direct concern to the applicant where the 
possibility of the addressee not 
implementing it. is only theoretical 
(Piraiki-Patraiki Cotton Industry v EC 
Commission (Case 11/82) [1985] ECR 
207). This will depend upon the 
circumstances of the particular case.
Perhaps more importantly, the ECJ has 
held, with regard to the requirement of 
individual concern, that:
'persons other than those to whom a
decision is addressed may only claim to bej j
individually concerned if that decision affects 
them by reason of certain attributes which are 
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances 
in which they are differentiated from all other 
persons and by virtue of these factors 
distinguishes them individually just as in the 
case oj the person addressed.' (Plaumann v 
EEC Commission (Case 25/62) [f 963] 
ECR 95)).
In applying this provision, the ECJ has 
held that applicants must belong to a 
closed and individually identifiable class 
of persons who, like the addressee, are 
more substantially affected by the 
decision than others (Toepfer v EEC
Commission (Joined Cases 106 and 
107/63) [1965] ECR).
The court adopted a similar approach 
in respect of applications brought under 
art. 173 by associations formed to 
represent the interests of individual 
members. Such associations will not be 
afforded standing to challenge measures 
which affect the general interests of their 
members (Federation Nationale de la 
Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en Gros des 
Viandcs v EEC Council (Joined Cases 
19-22/62) [1962] ECR 491). However, 
an individual who does not comply with 
these criteria may still be awarded 
standing where that individual was 
actively involved in the procedures which 
culminated in the Community institution 
concerned adopting the disputed 
decision (Timex Corp v EC Council and 
Commission (Case 264/82) [1985] ECR 
849). Similarly, associations which would 
otherwise be unable to assert that a 
decision is of direct and individual 
concern to them may also acquire 
standing on this basis (Kwekerij Gebroeders 
van der Kooy BV EC Commission (Joined 
Cases 67, 68 and 70/85) [1988] ECR 
219; [1989] 2 CEC 593).
In the Greenpeace case, the applicants 
sought to convince the court that these 
previous decisions had evolved in the 
context of specific identifiable legal 
interests. In contrast, environmental 
damage often does not infringe amo o
particular individual legal interest. All 
Community citizens share a general 
interest in the protection of the 
environment. As such, therefore, under 
existing law no closed class could exist for 
the purpose ot obtaining standing.
In the ECJ, Advocate General Comas 
was sympathetic to this argument. He 
found that the member states and 
Communitv institutions had a 
responsibility to protect a 'Community 
public interest' in the protection of the 
environment. He also asserted that the 
Commission's obligation to integrate 
environmental protection requirements 
into other policies, under art. 130(R)(2) 
of the EC Treaty, was capable of direct 
effect. Therefore individuals affected by a 
Commission decision had a legal interest 
in ensuring that that decision complied 
with this obligation. In defining those 
'affected' the Advocate General rejected 
calls for environmental associations to be 
granted general standing to protect the 
environment in situations where their
members, individually, would not have 
standing. He felt that such a right could 
be abused. However, he did consider that 
it might be possible to identify a closed 
class of persons, who could have 
standing, within an otherwise open class 
who could not. Amongst individual 
applicants, such a closed class could 
consist of persons who lived in close 
proximity to the source of the alleged 
environmental damage. However, as no 
evidence was given on this point, he was 
unable to pursue this argument.
However, in defining standing, the 
ECJ, as had previously the CFI, refused to 
redefine its existing case law. Theo
individual applicants were not affected by 
the project in any different way to other 
Canary Islands' residents. Therefore no 
closed class existed which might have 
standing under art. 173(4). The ECJ 
made no reference to the Advocate 
General's views on proximity. 
Additionally, they held that the fact that 
three applicants had lodged complaints 
with the Commission and that 
Greenpeace had corresponded with and 
met Commission officials did not 
constitute active involvement in the 
process which culminated in the 
adoption of the contested decision. 
Therefore again standing was denied. 
Even more fundamentally, the ECJ also 
failed to adopt the Advocate General's 
interpretation of the applicant's legal 
interests. Rather than finding any 
Community interest in the protection of 
the environment, the court held that the 
applicant's legal interests were limited to 
any particular interests which they might 
be granted under Community secondary 
legislation. In the context of theo
Greenpeace case, these were merely a right 
to participate in the preparation of an 
environmental impact assessment, under 
Directive 85/337. The court then 
declared that these rights were fully 
protected by the right to bring 
proceedings against national authorities 
in national courts. The court declared 
that, in this context, the national court 
could then challenge the legality of an 
alleged Commission through a 
preliminary reference.
CONCLUSION
The applicants in the An Taisce case 
observed that most projects financed by 
Community structural funds would not 
have been conducted by the member 15
states without that aid. In this position, 
therefore, the Commission must be 
expected to ensure that such projects are 
not likely to have effects which are 
contrary to Community environmental 
law. However, the An Taisce and Greenpeace 
cases show that in reality it is often very 
difficult to challenge the Commission's 
management of regional aid. It mav often 
be unclear whether in fact a Commission 
decision, or indeed any legal act, exists 
which is challengeable under art. 173.o
Even where such a decision can be 
identified, it would appear virtually 
impossible for individuals or 
environmental associations to obtain 
standing to challenge that decision.
It might be objected that, in this 
situation, the member states or other 
Communitv institutions will have 
standing to supervise the Commission. 
However, in reality, political 
considerations are very likely to dissuade 
these parties from adopting such a stance. 
Conversely, individuals living in areas 
affected by these projects and 
environmental associations have much 
greater incentive to pursue such actions. 
Contrary to the opinion of the ECJ, such 
litigants will not receive adequate 
remedies in national courts. For example, 
in the Greenpeace case, where the national 
proceedings concerned rights of 
participation in the conduct ot
environmental impact assessments, the 
national court has little reason to seek a 
preliminary reference on a very separate 
issue: the validity of Community funding 
for the project.
Overall, in practical terms it would 
appear that those most affected by the 
Commission's management of regional 
aid have most difficulty in holding the 
Commission to account. ©
Brian Jack
University of Wales, Aberystivyth
Insolvency
Insolvency proceedings: when are the directors not the company?
by P Goldenberg, S Maffey and N Buchanan
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A company is in dire financial trouble. 
Its directors meet. They take advice, as 
they must, from a licensed insolvency 
practitioner. They decide, by formal 
resolution, to petition for administration 
or liquidation. Is the petition that of the 
company or of the directors? The purpose 
of this article is to review the law, analyse 
the confusion and suggest a solution.
BACKGROUND
In Re Emmadart Limited ([1979] 
1 ALL ER 599), a receiver, in the name of 
the company and as its agent, presented a 
petition for the compulsory winding-up 
of the company with the object of gaining 
a rating exemption. It was held by 
Brightman J that the receiver had no
power to present the petition as the 
company's agent because, unless the 
articles conferred on the board of 
directors power to present the winding- 
up petition, the board had no power to 
present a petition without a resolution of 
the company in general meeting.
INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
It was partially to avoid the problems 
of Emmadart that s. 9(1) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 in relation to applications to the 
court for administration orders, and 
s. 124(1) of'that Act in relation to 
applications to the court for winding up, 
both provide, so far as material, that such 
an application 'shall be by petition 
presented either by the company or the 
directors'.
However, both the intention of this 
wording, and its consequences, are 
unclear. There are two possibilities. First, 
that in order to avoid the Emmadart 
problem, and without any specific 
delegation in a companv's articles of
O I ,'
association, the directors stand in place 
of the shareholders and have a specific 
power, acting corporately, to present a 
petition. Secondly, that the directors have 
an entirely separate power of petition, 
even where (hypothetically) the 
shareholders might disagree, because of 
the potential personal exposure of the
directors in the event of wrongful 
trading.
RECENT CASES
Two cases following the introduction 
of the Insolvency Act have contemplated 
this conundrum. In Re Instrumentation 
Electrical Services Limited ([1988] 4 BCC 
301), it was held by Mervyn Davis J that 
s. 124(1) permitted a petition to be 
presented only by all the directors, 
because:
(a) first, 'the directors' in that sub- 
section could not be read as 
meaning 'some of the directors' or 'a 
majority of the directors';
(b) secondly, the sub-section permitted 
a petition to be presented by 'any 
creditor or creditors ... contributory 
or contributories' (those phrases 
were to be contrasted with 'the 
directors'); and
(c) thirdly, the words at the end of the 
sub-section 'by all or anv of those 
parties, together or separately' could 
not refer back to 'the directors' so as 
to allow 'the directors' to be read as 
'some directors'.
In the subsequent case of Re Equiticorp 
International pic ([1989] BCLC 597), 
Millett J held that, once a resolution of
